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Abstract
I argue that the social implications of religious non-affiliation vary across cultural
contexts, leading to differences across nations in both who is likely to be unaffiliated
and the religious consequences of such non-affiliation. I test these propositions by
examining cross-national variation in associations with non-affiliation using multilevel models and cross-sectional survey data from almost 70,000 respondents in
52 nations. The results indicate that: 1) both individual characteristics (gender, age,
and marital status) and nation-level attributes (GDP, communism, and regulation
of religion) strongly predict religious non-affiliation; 2) differences in non-affiliation by individual-level attributes—women vs. men, old vs. young, and married vs.
single—are greatest in nations with low levels of religious regulation and high levels of economic development; and 3) the effect of religious non-affiliation on religiosity varies considerably by the political and religious context, and to a lesser extent by the level of economic development in each nation. These results highlight
cultural variation in what it means to be religiously unaffiliated.
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1. Introduction
A feature article in the April 2016 issue of National Geographic declared in its title: “The World’s Newest Major Religion: No Religion”
(Bullard, 2016). Growth in religious non-affiliation1 does indeed appear to be the most profound change in global religiosity in recent decades. As of 2010, there were 1.1 billion people with no religious affiliation, accounting for 16% of the world’s population (Hackett et al.,
2012). In the United States alone, the unaffiliated grew from about
7% of the population at the end of the 1980s to 20% in 2012 (Hout
and Fischer, 2014). The religiously unaffiliated or “nones” are the second largest religious group in 112 countries, or 48% of all nations on
the Earth (Hackett and Huynh, 2015). Thus far, research on the social antecedents and religious implications of the growing phenomenon of non-affiliation has been largely limited to the US population,
with a few researchers examining other, primarily Western nations
(e.g. Bowen, 2004; Hayes, 2000; Stark et al., 2005; Voas and Crockett, 2005; Voas and McAndrew, 2012).
The social significance of religion, however, differs from nation to
nation (Schwartz, 2007; Weber, 1948). Social acceptance of secularism
in particular varies geographically (Ribberink et al., 2013). The effects
of industrialization and modernization on religion differ across nations (Casanova, 1994), producing what Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt
(2012: 904) refer to as multiple secularities: “[T]he recognition that
the notions of the secular, of secularism and secularity are charged
with highly divergent meanings that are linked to different political
and cultural contexts and histories of social conflict.” The context-specific nature of the cultural relevance of non-affiliation suggests that
the demographic antecedents and religious implications of non-affiliation vary across nations. While factors such as gender and age may
predict non-affiliation in the US (Baker and Smith, 2009; Baker and
Whitehead, 2016), it is unclear how these associations play out crossnationally. Similarly, while the religiously unaffiliated in a few highly
1 I use the terms unaffiliated, non-affiliated, no religion, and apostate interchangeably
throughout this article. These terms are intended to convey lack of affiliation with a specific organized religion, not necessarily lack of religious belief or behavior. Indeed, as the
text discusses, it is not uncommon for the unaffiliated to hold standard religious beliefs.
For instance, the results in Table 3 indicate that more than one-half of the unaffiliated believe in God.
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developed nations report surprisingly high levels of religiosity (Stark
et al., 2005), it is unclear how the effects of non-affiliation on religiosity differ across populations.
This article advances understanding of both the social origins and
religious consequences of religious non-affiliation. I examine crossnational variation in associations with non-affiliation using multilevel models and cross-sectional survey data from almost 70,000 respondents in 52 nations. I address two primary research questions.
First, do the individual-level factors that predict religious non-affiliation vary across nations; and if so, what national attributes are associated with that variation? Specifically, I examine how the effects
of gender, age, marital status, and education on religious non-affiliation vary by the economic, political, and religious regulation context
in each nation. Second, do the effects of religious non-affiliation on
religiosity vary across nations; and if so, what are the factors associated with that variation? Specifically, I model how the effects of religious affiliation on religiosity vary by the economic, political, religious regulation, and religious affiliation context in each nation. The
results indicate that: 1) both individual and nation-level attributes
strongly predict religious non-affiliation; 2) differences in non-affiliation by individual-level attributes— women vs. men, old vs. young,
and married vs. single—are greatest in nations with low levels of religious regulation and high levels of economic development; and 3) the
effect of religious non-affiliation on religiosity varies considerably by
the political and religious context, and to a lesser extent by the level
of economic development in each nation. Ancillary models expand on
and provide additional nuance to these findings by examining the interaction between communism and state regulation of religion, alternative measures of religious regulation, and more specific measures
of the religious context in each nation. I conclude by discussing cultural variation in what it means to be religiously unaffiliated, and by
providing suggestions for future research.
1.1. The social origins of religious non-affiliation
Just as some demographic groups are relatively likely to be hold religious beliefs or participate in religious activities, people with certain attributes are relatively likely to have no religious affiliation.
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In particular, age, gender, family formation, and education appear
to be the primary characteristics associated with being religiously
unaffiliated. “The observation that women are more religious than
men,” notes Hoffmann (2009: 232), “may be closer to sociology’s ‘one
law’ than Durkheim’s famous proposition about religious faiths and
suicide.” Following the general pattern of higher female religiosity,
women are less likely than men to be unaffiliated (Baker and Smith,
2009). The strong, positive association between age and religion is another well-established social fact (Wink and Dillon, 2002). Thus, age
should negatively affect non-affiliation (Schwadel, 2010). As Heaton
and Goodman (1985:343) conclude, “Perhaps no other social institution has a closer link with religion than does the family.” Indeed, marriage is seen as a key factor protecting against apostasy (Baker and
Smith, 2015). Finally, higher education may “erode” religion (Johnson, 1997). Consequently, education is assumed to have a positive association with various forms of secularity (Baker and Smith, 2015).
I expect the relationships between these individual-level characteristics and religious non-affiliation to vary across nations. The social
and cultural implications of gender (Inglehart and Norris, 2003), age
(Ayalon et al., 2014), marital status (Cooke and Baxter, 2010), and education (Schwadel, 2015) differ across nations. What it means to be
old or young, a man or woman, college or not college educated, and
married or single are context specific. These are socially constructed
identities that are influenced by local cultures (Jenkins, 2008). Consequently, the impact of these demographic factors on the decision to
not affiliate with organized religion is likely to be influenced by the
national context. I draw on theories of modernization and economic
development, conformity in highly regulated societies, and the impact
of political systems to develop hypotheses regarding the nation-level
attributes that moderate the effects of individual-level characteristics
on religious non-affiliation.
I focus on three nation-level factors that may be related to variation in the association between individual-level attributes and religious non-affiliation. First, economic development, and modernity
more broadly, affect social relations and norms in various ways (including religious behaviors, which I take up in more detail in the next
section). The social and cultural significance of demographic attributes in particular appears to be tied to economic development. For
instance, gender roles vary by the level of economic development in a
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nation (Dollar and Gatti, 1999; Inglehart and Norris, 2003). Economic
development is associated with reductions in the disparity between
men’s and women’s roles in societies, which suggests that the effect
of gender on religious non-affiliation should be reduced in highly developed nations. The effects of other demographic attributes on religious non-affiliation may similarly be attenuated in more prosperous
nations. How we view the elderly, for example, varies across nations,
apparently in tandem with economic development (Sokolovsky, 2009).
The social structures and institutions of more developed nations provide stability in expectations that lead to enduring influences of early
life experiences (Dannefer, 2003), thereby potentially diminishing the
effects of age on attributes such as religious non-affiliation. Social
change research suggests a similar pattern with education, where
the association between education and apostasy declined in both the
US (Schwadel, 2014) and Great Britain (Voas and McAndrew, 2012)
as those nations became some of the most developed nations in the
world. The first hypothesis reflects this potential impact of economic
development: The effects of demographic attributes on religious nonaffiliation will be minimized in nations with higher per capita GDP.
The second relevant nation-level attribute is religious regulation,
which generally pertains to laws and institutions that favor one religion over others (Grim and Finke, 2006). The regulation of religion
appears to have a robust influence on many religious beliefs and behaviors (McCleary and Barro, 2006; Ruiter and Tubergen, 2009),
including religious non-affiliation (Gill and Lundsgaarde, 2004). In
most societies, being religiously unaffiliated is an innovative and even
deviant identity, which, as Tamney and colleagues (1989: 216) note,
“may evoke some negative sanctions.” The sanctions resulting from
non-affiliation, however, are qualitatively different in societies with
high levels of religious regulation. In such societies one does not only
risk existential existence or potentially social isolation by choosing
non-affiliation (Edgell et al., 2017); one also risks being exposed to
legal sanctions and, in some cases, imprisonment or even death for
religious non-conformity (Fox, 2015; Pew Research Center, 2017).
Legal regulations promote conformity and reduce deviation from established norms (Blanton and Hall, 2009). Therefore, the second hypothesis is as follows: The effects of demographic attributes on religious non-affiliation will be minimized in nations with high levels of
religious regulation.
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Third, the political context influences religious affiliation and, potentially, the association between education and religious nonaffiliation. There are relatively low levels of religiosity, and high levels of
non-affiliation, in communist and formerly communist nations (Fox
and Tabory, 2008; Froese, 2004). Communist regimes are generally
antagonistic toward religion; and this antagonism is often inculcated
through state institutions such as schools (Sacerdote and Glaeser,
2001). Consequently, greater exposure to educational institutions in
communist and post-communist states may promote secularism. The
third hypothesis is thus: The positive effect of higher levels of education on religious non-affiliation will be larger in communist and formerly communist nations. In sum, the first goal of this article is to test
how nation-level factors moderate the effects of individual-level, demographic attributes on religious nonaffiliation.
1.2. The religious consequences of non-affiliation
Turning to the consequences of religious non-affiliation, the second
goal of this article is to assess how nation-level factors moderate the
effects of non-affiliation on religiosity. Research in a few highly developed nations suggests that being religiously unaffiliated is not equivalent to being irreligious (e.g. Lim et al., 2010; Stark et al., 2005). For
instance, more than one-half of unaffiliated Americans are deists or
theists (Kosmin et al., 2009). As Hout and Fischer (2002: 175) conclude, “Few people with no religious preference showed any sign of
religious activity …. But they do pray.” In addition to highlighting the
potential religiosity of the unaffiliated, this quote points to an important caveat: Although the religiously unaffiliated are on average less
religious than those affiliated with organized religion, this difference
in religiosity varies across domains of religiosity. It is therefore important to examine various forms of religiosity.
Just as I argued that the effects of demographic characteristics
on religious non-affiliation vary across nations, I expect the association between non-affiliation and religiosity to vary across nations.
As discussed above, what it means to be religiously unaffiliated differs across nations (Ribberink et al., 2013). There are “multiple secularities,” which are tied to their local cultures (Wohlrab-Sahr and
Burchardt, 2012). The rapid growth of non-affiliation in the US, for
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example, appears to be partially motivated by political circumstances
rather than a decline in religion, leading to large numbers of unaffiliated Americans who hold conventional religious beliefs (Hout and
Fischer, 2014; Putnam and Campbell, 2010). In general, the form and
progress of secularization is dependent on the historic and geographic
context (Gorski, 2000; Martin, 1978), suggesting that the religious implications of nonaffiliation vary across nations. I draw from several
theoretical perspectives—including secularization and modernization
theories, supply-side views of religiosity, and social psychological perspectives on group norms—to develop hypotheses regarding the nation-level attributes that moderate the effects of non-affiliation on religiosity. In addition to the three nation-level factors discussed in the
previous section—economic development, religious regulation, and
communism—I also generate expectations about the influence of the
religious context in each nation.
Secularization and modernization theories emphasize the detrimental influence of economic development on traditional forms of religiosity. This is perhaps most notably articulated by Norris and Inglehart (2004), who argue that the existential security provided by
economic prosperity reduces the need for religion by diminishing the
uncertainty of daily life. With some caveats, empirical research generally supports this proposition. The social importance of religion, for
example, varies with the level of economic development (Bettendorf
and Dijkgraaf, 2008). It is more acceptable to eschew religious beliefs
and behaviors in more developed nations (Norris and Inglehart, 2004;
Taylor, 2007). Consequently, the unaffiliated may feel freer to exhibit
additional signs of secularity in such contexts. The fourth hypothesis
is thus: Differences in religiosity between the affiliated and unaffiliated are larger in nations with high per capita GDP.
In contrast to economic prosperity, religious regulation may be associated with fewer differences in religiosity between the affiliated
and unaffiliated. The potential consequences of religious behaviors—or
lack thereof—are greater where there is more government regulation
of religion (Grim and Finke, 2006). Sanctions inhibit non-conformity
(Blanton and Hall, 2009), which may lead the religiously affiliated
and unaffiliated behave more similarly to one another. Additionally,
the religious economies or supply-side perspective on religious vitality suggests that the regulation of religion diminishes religiosity in the
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population more broadly (Stark and Finke, 2000). While most people in a nation with high levels of religious regulation may be affiliated with a religion (or “the religion”), the supply-side argument is
that affiliation in such societies is nominal in nature. Consequently,
there should be relatively little difference in religiosity between the
affiliated and unaffiliated in those nations. Thus, the fifth hypothesis:
Differences in religiosity between the affiliated and unaffiliated will be
minimized in nations with high levels of religious regulation.
The religious context may also play a role. The prevalence of religious non-affiliation varies dramatically across nations (Hackett and
Huynh, 2015; Warf, 2015). The unaffiliated should behave differently
when they constitute a larger proportion of a nation. Popular culture
is tied to the religious character of a nation (Friedland, 2001) and will
thus convey different messages about the importance of religiosity depending on the prevalence of non-affiliation. This expectation has a
firm grounding in social psychological perspectives, which emphasize
the importance of the social context in conditioning social expectations. Mead’s (1934) conception of the generalized other is particularly
relevant, as the generalized other takes on different characteristics
in nations with high levels of non-affiliation. Social structure—in this
case the prevalence of non-affiliation—influences behavioral expectations (McLeod and Lively, 2003), such as expectations regarding religious beliefs and behaviors (Weber, 1948). Consequently, the sixth
hypothesis: Differences in religiosity between the affiliated and unaffiliated are larger in nations with high levels of religious non-affiliation.
Finally, the political context should affect the association between
non-affiliation and religiosity. As noted above, non-affiliation is more
normative in communist and post-communist nations (Fox and Tabory,
2008; Froese, 2004). Lack of religious belief and participation are not
only socially acceptable but even state-sanctioned in many communist and formerly communist nations (Barber, 2011; Barro and McCleary, 2003). Unlike the predominant form of religious regulation,
which favors one religion over others (Grim and Finke, 2006), communist states generally favor secularity. Similar to the proposed effect of large numbers of religious nonaffiliates, the sanctioning of secularity in communist nations may strengthen the connection between
non-affiliation and low levels of religiosity. Thus, the seventh hypothesis is as follows: Differences in religiosity between the affiliated and
unaffiliated are larger in communist and post-communist nations. In
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sum, the analyses below further understanding of religious non-affiliation by examining nation-level factors that moderate both the demographic characteristics that predict non-affiliation and the effects
of religious affiliation on religiosity.
1.3. Data
I use data from the most recent World Values Survey (WVS 6), which
was administered between 2010 and 2014. WVS 6 includes survey data
from more than 86,000 respondents in 60 nations. Both full probability and quota sampling procedures were used to reach the goal of
surveying at least 1,000 respondents age 18 or older in each nation.
The surveys were primarily administered face-to-face. Religious affiliation and/or religiosity questions were not included on surveys in
eight nations.2 After deleting those eight nations, and deleting individual cases with missing data on the dependent variables, there are
70,340 respondents in 52 nations. Another 929 cases are deleted due
to missing data on other variables in the models, resulting in an analytic sample of 69,414. The dependent variables gauge non-affiliation
and religiosity. A dummy variable indicates religious non-affiliation.
The WVS includes four broadly-applicable measures of religiosity. Religious service attendance is a seven-category measure ranging from
never/practically never to more than once a week. Frequency of prayer
is an eight-category variable ranging from never/practically never to
several times a day. Service attendance and prayer are standardized
to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Dummy variables indicate belief in God and considering one’s self religious. Descriptive statistics for all variables are reported in Table 1.
The models include several individual-level independent variables.
Dummy variables indicate married and female respondents. Ideally,
the models would also include a measure of having children. As Baker
and Smith (2015: 152) note, “What often reverses apostasy are marriage and having children.” Unfortunately, there is considerable missing data on the survey question about having children, including an
entire country that did not get the question. Consequently, having children is not included in the models, though the results reported here
2 The eight deleted nations are Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, Palestine, Morocco, Tunisia,
and Yemen.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
		
LEVEL-1 (INDIVIDUAL)
No Religious Affiliation
Christian
Muslim
Other Religion
Religious Service Attendance
Frequency of Prayer
Believe in God
Consider Self Religious
Agea
Married
Female
Education:
No Secondary School Degree
Secondary-Vocational
Secondary-University Prep
Some College
College Degree

Mean (Percent)
(19.5%)
(46.9%)
(23.1%)
(10.4%)
.000
.000
(84.7%)
(67.3%)
42.465
(55.2%)
(52.9%)

Standard Deviation

1.000
1.000
16.703

(35.8%)
(20.2%)
(18.0%)
(7.9%)
(18.1%)

LEVEL-2 (NATION)
Communist/Former Communist
GRI		
GDP
Proportion No Religious Affiliation

(26.9%)
3.567
16.387
.189

3.115
17.010
.209

Level-2 Variables in Ancillary Models:
Established/Favored Religion
No State Religion
State Hostile to Religion
Proportion Christian
Proportion Muslim
Proportion Other Religion

(30.8%)
(59.6%)
(9.6%)
.474
.234
.102

.341
.372
.199

Level-1 N = 69,414; level-2 N = 52.
a. Age is centered so it has a mean of zero, and age-squared is added to the models when
significant (p < .05).

are similar when having children is included in the models.3 Age is
coded in years of age. Age-squared is included in the models when statistically significant (p < .05) to compensate for nonlinear age effects.
3 The results are similar when the models of non-affiliation include a dummy variable that
indicates having children (not shown). Specifically, the effects of age, gender, marriage,
and education are substantively unchanged (both overall effects and variation across nations), and there is a significant, negative effect of children (considerably smaller than the
effects of gender and marriage) that does not vary significantly across nations.
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Education is measured with dummy variables for those who completed
secondary technical/vocational school, secondary university preparatory school, some university education, and a university degree. Not
completing secondary school is the omitted reference category. Models of religiosity include dummy variables for Christian, Muslim, and
other religion respondents, with the unaffiliated as the omitted reference category. This modeling strategy accounts for differences in religiosity between affiliates of different religions (Halman and Draulans, 2006).
There are several nation-level independent variables included in the
models. Regulation of religion is assessed with the Government Regulation Index (GRI), which measures “restrictions placed on the practice, profession, or selection of religion by the official laws, policies,
or administrative actions of the state” (Grim and Finke, 2006: 7). Economic prosperity is assessed with the 2012 per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), derived from the International Monetary Fund and
reported in US dollars (divided by 1,000 to produce more comparable
coefficients). A dummy variable indicates communist and formerly
communist nations (see La Porta et al., 1998). Finally, the proportion
of the nation reporting no religious affiliation is included as an independent variable in the models of religiosity. Ancillary models replace
the GRI measure of religious regulation with dummy variables for nations with established or favored religions and nations that are hostile
toward religion, with the large category of nations with no state religion serving as the omitted reference category (Pew Research Center,
2017). The Ancillary models also examine the influence of proportion
Christian, Muslim, and other religion in each nation, rather than the
proportion unaffiliated.
1.4. Analysis technique
I use two-level multilevel models with individuals nested in nations to
gauge 1) the effects of independent variables on religious non-affiliation and 2) the effects of religious non-affiliation on religiosity. These
models adjust for lack of independence between individuals and the
nations they live in with separate level-1 (individual) and level-2 (nation) error terms (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). The level-1 model for
non-affiliation, for example, is as follows:
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Logit (Religious Non-Affiliation)ij = β0
+ β1 Femaleij
+ β2 Marriedij
+ β3 Technical Secondary Degreeij
+ β4 Preparatory Secondary Degreeij
+ β5 Some Collegeij
+ β6 College Degreeij
+ β7 Ageij
+ β8 Ageij2
+ rij
where the log odds of non-affiliation for person i in nation j is regressed on education, gender, marital status, and age, with the error term or variance component r. The level-2 model of non-affiliation is as follows:
β0j = γ00 + γ01Communistj + γ02GDPj + γ03GRIj + u0j
where γ00 is the logged overall mean of non-affiliation, γ01 through γ03
are the coefficients for nation-level variables, and u0j represents the
error or unexplained variation specific to nation j.
An important advantage to multilevel models is the ability to include random slopes, which are used here to assess variation in the
effects of independent variables on non-affiliation and variation in
the effect of non-affiliation on religiosity. Cross-level interactions between level-1 and level-2 variables are key to gauging how the effects
of individual attributes on non-affiliation vary by nation-level characteristics, and how the effect of non-affiliation on religiosity varies
by nation-level characteristics. For instance, the cross-level interactions and random slope for gender in the model of non-affiliation are
as follows:
β1Femaleij = γ10 + γ11Communistj + γ12GDPj + γ13GRIj + u1j
where u1j is variation in the slope of gender specific to nation j, and
γ11, γ12, and γ13 are the interaction terms.
The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, I present results from
binary logistic multilevel models of religious non-affiliation, focusing
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on variation in the effects of age, gender, marital status, and education
across nations. Second, I present results from multilevel models of the
four measures of religiosity, focusing on variation in the effects of religious affiliation across nations. Third, I present results from ancillary analyses that examine the interaction between communism and
state regulation of religion, alternative measures of religious regulation, and the influence of more specific measures of the religious context in each nation. The models are weighted and conducted in HLM
7. All variables other than the focal level-1 variables with random
slopes are centered on the overall or grand mean. Several figures highlight the important findings. Only statistically significant coefficients
(p < .05) are used in calculations to produce the figures.

2. Results
2.1. The effects of individual-level characteristics on religious
non-affiliation
Results from multilevel models of religious non-affiliation are reported in Table 2. Model 2-A shows that age (b = –.048, and agesquared b = –.008), gender (b = –.198), and marital status (b = –.139)
each have strong, negative effects on the likelihood of reporting no religious affiliation. Women’s odds of non-affiliation, for example, are
(℮–.198 = .820, 0.820 – 1 = ) 18% lower than men’s odds of non-affiliation. At level-2, communism (b = .901) and GDP (b = .026) are
positively associated with non-affiliation while religious regulation
(GRI) has a negative effect (b = –.201). The variance components
show that the effects of all the independent variables except for agesquared vary significantly across nations.4 For instance, in the 47 out
of 52 nations where married has a significant (p < .05) negative effect, marriage is associated with between an 8% and 45% decrease
in the odds of non-affiliation (nation-specific odds ratios not shown,
available on request). Moreover, marriage has a significant, positive
effect on non-affiliation in three nations. The nation-specific effects
4 There are too few degrees of freedom to include random slopes for all independent variables. Alternative models (not shown) indicate that variation in the effect of age-squared
has no substantive impact on the results.
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Table 2. Binary logistic multilevel models of religious non-affiliation.
Fixed effects
			

Model 2-A
b

Model 2-B
se

Intercept
−1.078
.106***
Level-1 (Individual)
Agea
–.048
.011***
		 × (Former) Communist			
		 × GRIb			
		 × GDPb 			
Age-Squaredb
–.008
.004*
Married
–.139
.027***
		 × (Former) Communist 			
		 × GRI 			
		 × GDP 			
Female
–.198
.027***
		 × (Former) Communist 			
		 × GRI			
		 × GDP			
Education:
		 Secondary-Vocational
.049
.030
		 × (Former) Communist			
		 × GRI			
		 × GDP			
		 Secondary-University Prep
.029
.034
		 × (Former) Communist			
		 × GRI			
		 × GDP
.001
.003
Some College
.005
.046
		 × (Former) Communist			
		 × GRI 			
		 × GDP			
College Degree
.070
.044
		 × (Former) Communist			
		 × GRI 			
		 × GDP			
Level-2 (Nation)
(Former) Communist
.901
.401*
GRI
–.201
.053***
GDP
.026
.005***
Random effects
Intercept
Agea
Married
Female
Secondary-Vocational
Secondary-University Prep
Some College
College Degree
AIC		

Variance Component

b

se

−1.081

.099***

–.050
.002
.089
–.015
–.007
–.139
–.109
.030
–.002
–.198
–.101
.023
–.000

.009***
.001
.027**
.008*
.004*
.022***
.060
.009**
.001
.026***
.066
.008**
.002

.052
.023
.002
.001
.025
.199
–.010

.030
.059
.008
.003
.032
.084*
.011

.017
.146
–.024
.001
.062
.164
–.005
.001

.045
.124
.014
.004
.042
.142
.016
.003

.509
–.104
.027

.300
.045*
.005***

Variance Component

3.112*** 		
.011***		
.050***		
.091***		
.111***		
.147***		
.281***		
.241***		

2.784***
.008***
.050***
.075***
.103***
.111***
.218***
.235***

186707 		

187510

Level-1 N = 69,414; level-2 N = 52
* p < .05 ; ** p < .01 ; *** p < .001
a. Coefficient and standard error multiplied by 10, variance component multiplied by 100.
b. Coefficient and standard error multiplied by 100.
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shed light on why college graduation does not have the expected positive association with non-affiliation at the aggregate. College graduation does indeed have a significant, positive effect on non-affiliation in 30 nations, but it also has a significant, negative effect in 12
nations, and no effect in 10 other nations. This finding comports with
both research showing changes in the effects of education on religion
within nations (e.g. Schwadel, 2014; Voas and McAndrew, 2012) and
research showing cross-national variation in the effects of education
on religion (e.g. Hayes, 2000; Schwadel, 2015). Overall, the results
from Model 2-A point to considerable variability in the demographic
composition of non-affiliation around the globe.
Model 2-B includes cross-level interactions. The AIC increases from
Model 2-A to 2-B, indicating worse model fit, which is not surprising
given the number of insignificant interactions in Model 2-B. Nonetheless, the variance component for the intercept is reduced in Model 2-B,
which indicates that a notable proportion of the between-nation variance has been explained with the addition of interactions to the model.
There are significant interactions between GRI and age, marital status,
and gender; between GDP and age; and between university prep secondary school degree and communist. The significant interactions with GRI
are depicted in Fig. 1, which shows the effects of gender, marital status, and age for those in nations with the no religious regulation (eight
nations have a GRI of 0), nations at the mean of GRI, and nations one
standard deviation above the mean of GRI. As Fig. 1a shows, women
(probability of 0.23) are less likely than men (probability of 0.28) to
report no religious affiliation in nations with no religious regulation.
In high-GRI nations, there are lower levels of non-affiliation for both
men and women, but almost no difference between men (probability of
0.16) and women (probability of 0.15). Fig. 1b shows a similar pattern
for marital status, where the difference in the probability of non-affiliation between the married (less than 0.24) and unmarried (more than
0.27) in nations with no religious regulation is nonexistent in high-GRI
nations. Fig. 1c shows that there is a robust, negative effect of age in
nations with low levels of religious regulation but not in nations with
high levels of religious regulation. For instance, the difference in probability of nonaffiliation between the oldest and youngest respondents
is 0.12 in nations with no government regulation of religion and only
0.02 in nations one standard deviation above the mean of GRI. Overall,
these results indicate that the effects of age, gender, and marital status
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Fig. 1. Variation in individual-level predictors of religious non-affiliation by GRI.

are amplified in nations with little or no government regulation of religion, and minimized in nations with high levels of government regulation, which supports Hypotheses 2.
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Fig. 2. Variation in effect of age on religious non-affiliation by GDP.

Model 2-B additionally shows that the effect of age varies by GDP.
This interaction is depicted in Fig. 2, which shows that the negative
effect of age is far more robust in nations with a high GDP. This is
in contrast to Hypothesis 1, which suggests that the effects of demographic attributes on non-affiliation are instead reduced in high GDP
nations. The difference in the probability of nonaffiliation between
the oldest and youngest respondents is almost 0.19 in a nation one
standard deviation above the mean of GDP and only 0.07 in a nation
at the 20th percentile of GDP.
The only significant interaction with education indicates that there
is no difference in non-affiliation between those with a secondary prep
school degree and those with no secondary school degree in non-communist nations, but in communist and formerly communist nations
a secondary prep school degree is associated with 0.03 greater probability of non-affiliation (not shown in figure). This may reflect indoctrination into communist governments’ opposition to religion in
some secondary schools (Sacerdote and Glaeser, 2001), and provides
some support for Hypothesis 3. Overall, the results in Table 2 reveal
extensive differences across nations in the effects of individual-level
factors on religious non-affiliation. Who is and is not likely to be religiously unaffiliated is indeed context specific, varying considerably
by the level of religious regulation and to a lesser extent by communism and the level of economic development. Next, I examine variation in the implications of non-affiliation.
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2.2. The effects of religious non-affiliation on religiosity
Results from models of religiosity are reported in Table 3. The effects
of Christian, Muslim, and other religion are robust and positive across
all four indicators of religiosity. Not surprisingly, the unaffiliated are
the least religious. The variance components, however, show that the
effects of religious affiliation vary across nations. For instance, although Christian has a significant (p < .05), positive effect on service attendance in each nation, the nation-specific coefficients vary
between 0.171 and 1.84 (not shown). The intercepts reflect religiosity

Table 3. Multilevel models of religiosity without interactions.
Fixed effects

Service Attendance
b

se

Intercept
–.774
Level-1 (Individual)
Christian
.996
Muslim
.923
Other Religion
.877
Age
.003
Married
.062
Female
–.017
Education:
Secondary-Vocational
.014
Secondary-University Prep .002
Some College
.058
College Degree
.026
Level-2 (Nation)
(Former) Communist
–.604
GRI
–.013
GDP
–.013
Proportion Unaffiliated
–.014

Frequency of Prayer
b

se

.058**

–.682

.058***
.071***
.072***
.001***
.014***
.050

.832
.961
.737
.005
.022
.170

.013
.017
.015***
.020
.093***
.018
.004***
.181

Believe in Goda
b

.083

se

Consider Self Religiousa
b

se

.064

.139***

–.744

.134***

.077***
.085***
.080***
.001***
.011
.021***

1.654
2.210
1.248
.002
.044
.298

.159***
.159***
.139***
.001
.022*
.028***

1.766
2.130
1.680
.009
.113
.288

.134***
.163***
.157***
.001***
.021***
.028***

–.010
–.005
.021
.004

.015
.018
.018
.022

–.039
–.054
–.093
–.127

.025
.026*
.037*
.049**

–.050
–.097
–.092
–.124

.032
.038**
.039*
.049*

–.809
–.009
–.015
–.149

.109***
.018
.003***
.276

.227***
.029
.007***
.429***

–.081
–.086
–.021
–.189

.226
.030**
.005***
.479

−1.075
–.034
–.029
−1.510

Random effects

Variance Comp

Variance Comp

Variance Comp

Variance Comp

Intercept
Christian
Muslim
Other Religion
Level-1 (Individual)

.133***		
.139***		
.169***		
.181***		
.591		

.211***		
.197***		
.236***		
.259***		
.490		

1.374***		
1.836***		
1.361***		
.976***		
–		

1.835***
1.901***
2.130***
1.747***
–

161117		

148087		

190565		

AIC

Level-1 N = 69,414; level-2 N = 52
* p < .05 ; ** p < .01 ; *** p < .001
a. Models of believe in God and consider self religious are binary logistic multilevel models.
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among the unaffiliated because religious affiliation measures are not
centered. Significant, negative intercepts in three out of four models
in Table 3 indicate low levels of religiosity among the unaffiliated. The
positive intercept in the model of belief in God means the unaffiliated
are more likely than not to believe in God (i.e. probability over 0.5).
Still, the negative effect of proportion unaffiliated (b = –1.510) in that
model points to relatively low levels of belief in God in nations where
a large proportion of the population is unaffiliated. Other level-2 variables show that living in a communist or formerly communist nation
has a negative effect on prayer (b = –.809), attendance (b = –.604),
and belief in God (b = –1.075), and religious regulation has a negative
effect on considering one’s self religious (b = –.086). In line with research on religion, economic development, and modernization more
broadly (e.g. Norris and Inglehart, 2004), GDP has a strong, negative
effect on all four measures of religiosity.
The multilevel models of religiosity in Table 4 introduce cross-level
interactions between religious affiliations and nation-level characteristics. The addition of interactions leads to a reduction in AIC, and
therefore improved model fit, in all the models except for the model
of service attendance (though only minimally in the model of prayer).
The most consistent finding across the models is the positive interaction between religious affiliations—particularly Christian (three of
four models) and Muslim (all four models)—and proportion unaffiliated. These interactions, which are depicted in Fig. 3, indicate that
differences in religiosity between the affiliated and unaffiliated are
greater in nations with large unaffiliated populations. For instance, as
Fig. 3a shows, the difference in service attendance between the unaffiliated and Muslims grows as the proportion unaffiliated increases.
Estimated difference in attendance between Muslims and the unaffiliated is 0.89 in a nation with only 1% unaffiliated and 1.30 in a nation
one standard deviation above the mean of proportion unaffiliated. Fig.
3b shows that differences in frequency of prayer between the unaffiliated and both Muslims and Christians grow as the proportion unaffiliated increases. For instance, estimated difference in prayer between
Christians and the unaffiliated is 0.47 in a nation with 1% unaffiliated and 0.74 in a nation one standard deviation above the mean of
proportion unaffiliated. Fig. 3c shows that differences in belief in God
between the unaffiliated and affiliates of all three religious traditions
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Table 4. Multilevel models of religiosity with cross-level interactions.
Fixed effects

Service Attendance
b

Intercept
Level-1 (Individual)
Christian
× (Former) Communist
× GRI
× GDP
× Proportion Unaffiliated
Muslim
× (Former) Communist
× GRI
× GDP
× Proportion Unaffiliated

se

b

b

se

Consider Self Religiousa
b

se

.062***

–.651

.071***

.767

.139***

–.624

.122***

.985
–.021
.005
–.001
.373
.936
–.265
–.002
–.004
1.047

.063***
.180
.031
.005
.337
.068***
.153
.027
.005
.380**

.800
.179
.019
.006
.694
.934
–.088
.018
.005
.829

.066***
.210
.033
.005
.331*
.074***
.185
.029
.005
.388*

1.544
1.331
.002
.020
1.650
2.092
.772
.017
.021
1.901

.154***
.396**
.061
.009*
.566**
.145***
.365*
.048
.006***
.579**

1.634
1.326
–.063
.008
1.959
2.017
.693
–.010
.011
2.133

.126***
.381***
.066
.010
.822*
.143***
.389
.057
.008
.901*

.713
.190
.023
.004
.281
.001***
.014***
.050

.084*** 1.194
.547
.241*
–.049
.035
.009
.005
–.196
.346
.005
.001***
.022
.011
.170
.021***

.013
.017
.015***
.020

–.010
–.005
.021
.004

.015
.018
.018
.022

.132***
.019
.004**
.183

–.851
–.025
–.019
–.758

.169***
.024
.004***
.278**

Level-2 (Nation)
(Former) Communist
GRI
GDP
Proportion Unaffiliated

–.506
–.007
–.012
–.348

Random effects

Variance Comp.

AIC

se

Believe in Goda

–.762

Other Religion .853
.071***
× (Former) Communist
–.270
× GRI
.026
× GDP
–.001
× Proportion Unaffiliated
.215
Age
.003
Married
.062
Female
–.017
Education:
Secondary-Vocational
.014
Secondary-University Prep .002
Some College
.058
College Degree
.026

Intercept
Christian
Muslim
Other Religion
Level-1 (Individual)

Frequency of Prayer

Variance Comp.

.114*** 1.602
1.472
.289***
.006
.043
.017
.008*
1.030
.458*
.002
.001
.044
.023
.307
.029***
–.039
–.054
–.094
–.130
−1.567
–.005
–.036
−2.052

.025
.027*
.038*
.050**
.337***
.050
.007***
.601***

Variance Comp.

.132***
1.794
–.084
.016
1.002
.010
.117
.299
–.051
–.100
–.093
–.129
−1.158
–.031
–.031
−1.456

.033
.039**
.040*
.051*
.305***
.045
.007***
.451**

Variance Comp.

.123***		
.135***		
.132***		
.152***		
.591		

.181***		
.153***		
.188***		
.222***		
.490		

1.334***		
1.552***		
1.183***		
.810***		
–		

1.319***
1.420***
1.489***
1.014***
–

161128		

148086		

190091		

196131

Level-1 N = 69,414; level-2 N = 52
* p < .05 ; ** p < .01 ; *** p < .001
a. Models of believe in God and consider self religious are binary logistic multilevel models.

.336***
.056
.009
.659
.001***
.021***
.029***
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Fig. 3. Variation
in effects of
religious affiliation
on religiosity
by presence of
unaffiliated in
nation.
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increase as the percent with no affiliation in the nation increases. In a
nation with 1% unaffiliated, the probability of belief in God is 0.85 for
Christians, 0.91 for Muslims, and 0.76 for both affiliates of other religions and the unaffiliated. In a nation one standard deviation above
the mean of proportion unaffiliated, the probability of belief in God is
0.83 for Christians, 0.90 for Muslims, 0.68 for affiliates of other religions, and less than 0.59 for the unaffiliated. Fig. 3d shows substantial growth in differences in considering one’s self religious between
the unaffiliated and both Christians and Muslims as the proportion
unaffiliated in a nation increases. Although Christians’ and Muslims’
likelihood considering themselves religious increases moderately as
the proportion unaffiliated increases, the probability of considering
one’s self religious for the unaffiliated declines from 0.44 in a nation
with 1% unaffiliated to 0.31 in a nation one standard deviation above
the mean of unaffiliated. Another way to view these results is that that
non-affiliates’ religiosity (all measures but attendance) is considerably
lower in nations where non-affiliation is more common but the religiosity of religious affiliates—particularly Christians and Muslims—
is not diminished by the prevalence of non-affiliation in the nation.
These findings provide strong support for Hypothesis 6.
There are significant interactions between religious affiliations and
living in a communist or formerly communist nation in three of the
four models of religiosity in Table 4. These interactions are depicted
in Fig. 4. Fig. 4a shows that the difference in prayer between the unaffiliated and affiliates of other religions is larger in communist and
formerly communist nations (1.18) than in noncommunist nations
(0.63). As Fig. 4b shows, differences in belief in God between the unaffiliated and affiliates of all three religious traditions are far more
robust in communist and formerly communist nations. In non-communist nations, probability of belief in God is 0.85 for Christians, 0.91
for Muslims, and 0.77 for both the unaffiliated and affiliates of other
religions. In communist and formerly communist nations, probability of belief in God is 0.82 for Christians and Muslims, 0.75 for affiliates of other religions, and 0.41 for the unaffiliated. Fig. 4c reveals
a similar pattern with considering one’s self religious, though communism only moderates the effects of Christian and other religion,
not Muslim. On the whole, the results in Fig. 4 highlight the robust,
negative effects of communism on the religiosity of the unaffiliated
in particular, which leads to larger differences in religiosity between
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Fig. 4. Variation in effects of religious affiliation on religiosity by communism.

the affiliated and unaffiliated in communist and formerly communist
nations. These findings support Hypothesis 7.
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Fig. 5. Variation in effects of religious affiliation on belief in god by GDP.

Finally, there are significant interactions between each religious
affiliation and GDP in the model of belief in God in Table 4. As Fig. 5
shows, GDP is associated with a large decline in belief in God among
the unaffiliated, and far more moderate declines among the religiously
affiliated. Consequently, there are particularly large differences in belief in God between the affiliated and unaffiliated in nations with high
per capita GDP, which provides some support for Hypothesis 4. For instance, in a nation at the 20th percentile of GDP, probability of belief
in God is 0.87 for Christians, 0.91 for Muslims, and 0.79 for affiliates
of other religions and the unaffiliated. In a nation one standard deviation above the mean of GDP, probability of belief in God is 0.80 for
Christians, 0.88 for Muslims, 0.67 for affiliates of other religions, and
0.54 for the unaffiliated. There are no significant interactions between
religious affiliations and GRI, thus providing no support for Hypothesis 5. In general, the results in Table 4 indicate that differences in religiosity between the affiliated and unaffiliated are greatest in communist and formerly communist nations, high per capita GDP nations,
and nations with large unaffiliated populations.
2.3. Ancillary models
Extant theoretical and empirical research suggests several alternative model specifications that I address in this final results section.
First, as the discussion of communism above indicates, the effects of
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communism are expected to derive from antagonism toward religion
commonly found in communist and post-communist governments.
Consequently, the effects of communism may be tied to the level of
religious regulation in the nation. I address this possibility with models that include interactions between GRI and communism. Models of
non-affiliation reveal no significant two-way interactions between GRI
and communism, nor three-way interactions between GRI, communism, and level-1 demographic attributes (not shown). When it comes
to models of religiosity, however, there are some notable interactions
between GRI and communism.
As the results in Table 5 show, there is a significant, positive interaction between communism and GRI in the models of service attendance and belief in God (Models 5-A), which means the negative effect of communism on both those measures of religiosity is reduced
in nations with high levels of religious regulation. This is somewhat
Table 5. Focal fixed effects results from multilevel models of religiosity with interactions between
communism and GRI.
Service Attendance
b

se

Frequency of Prayer
b

MODELS 5-A
(Former) Communist
GRI
(Former) Communist × GRI

–.736
.016
.127

.240**
.049
.051*

MODELS 5-B
Christian
× (Former) Communist
× GRI
× (Former) Communist × GRI
Muslim
× (Former) Communist
× GRI
× (Former) Communist × GRI
Other Religion
× (Former) Communist
× GRI
× (Former) Communist × GRI

2.147
.271
.046
–.082
2.024
–.713
–.014
.029
1.873
–.009
–.019
–.126

.148***
.652
.086
.123
.156***
.474
.084
.098
.157***
.475
.067
.094

−1.533
.016
–.127
2.225
1.519
.189
–.289
2.576
.863
.172
–.280
2.039
3.917
.091
–.584

se

.541**
.053
.098
.170***
.925
.083*
.167
.197***
.944
.086*
.175
.199***
.914***
.084
.176**

Believe in Goda
b

se

Consider Self Religiousa
b

se

−1.890
–.108
.182

.266***
.036**
.054***

.173
–.070
–.049

.246
.041
.067

1.594
1.672
.055
–.100
2.105
1.573
.107
–.191
1.235
2.042
.060
–.142

.155***
.514**
.076
.111
.143***
.448***
.054
.084*
.109***
.250***
.053
.062*

1.627
1.270
–.071
.017
2.003
.558
–.018
.031
1.638
2.766
–.049
–.184

.137***
.717
.080
.138
.153***
.940
.065
.167
.134***
.544***
.069
.107

All models control for age, gender, marital status, education, proportion unaffiliated, and GDP; Models 5-A also include
religious tradition dummies; Models 5-B also include main effects for communism, GRI, and communism × GRI, and
interactions between religious tradition dummies and both proportion unaffiliated and GDP; Level-1 N = 69,414; level-2
N = 52.
* p < .05 ; ** p < .01 ; *** p < .001
a. Models of believe in God and consider self religious are binary logistic multilevel models.
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counterintuitive as the negative effect of communism on religiosity is
thought to be a result of communist states’ regulation of religion. More
to the point of the article, the three-way interactions in the model of
belief in God (Model 5-B) show significant, negative interactions between GRI, communism, and both Muslim and other religion. These
interactions indicate that while Muslims and affiliates of other religions in communist nations are especially more likely than the unaffiliated to believe in God (interactions between affiliations and communism are positive), such differences in belief in God are reduced in
higher GRI nations. The same pattern applies to differences in prayer
between affiliates of other religions and the unaffiliated. These results
are also somewhat counterintuitive as they suggest that high levels of
religious regulation mitigate rather than exacerbate the influence of
living in a communist or post-communist nation on differences in religiosity between the affiliated and unaffiliated; though, as Grim and
Finke (2006) note, religious regulation generally pertains to favoring
one religion over others, not favoring irreligion over religion.
The potential problem with measuring religious regulation along
a single dimension leads to the second alternate analysis. The influence of religious regulation may differ in nations that regulate religion by supporting one religion over others and nations that regulate
religion by suppressing all religions. Thus, I replace the GRI measure
with two dummy variables: one for nations that have established religions or favor one religion over others, and one for nations that are
hostile toward religion (see Pew Research Center, 2017). Having no
state religion but also not being hostile toward religion is the largest
category and serves as the omitted reference category. Models of no
religious affiliation reveal that having an established or favored religion has a negative effect on nonaffiliation, but the establishment/
favored religion and hostile toward religion variables do not interact
significantly with the demographic variables used to predict non-affiliation (not shown).
As Table 6 shows, when it comes to models of religiosity, there are
notable interactions between religious affiliations and both establishment/favored religion and hostility toward religion (Models 6-B). This
is clearest in the models of belief in God and considering one’s self religious. For instance, living in a nation with an established/favored religion increases differences in belief in God between the unaffiliated
and Christians (b = 1.354), Muslims (b = 1.110), and affiliates of other
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Table 6. Focal fixed effects results from multilevel models of religiosity with measures of state
support for and hostility toward religion.
Service Attendance
b
MODELS 6-A
State Hostile toward Religionb
Established/Favored Religionb

se

Frequency of Prayer
b

se

Believe in Goda
b

se

–.410
–.221

.113***
.084*

–.448
–.079

.159**
.116

.041
–.300

.308
.233

MODELS 6-B
Christian
.986
× State Hostile toward Religionb –.194
× Established/Favored Religionb .005
Muslim
.952
× State Hostile toward Religionb .074
× Established/Favored Religionb .232
Other Religion
.890

.059***
.193
.125
.064***
.179
.150
.063***

.801
–.310
.199
.952
.150
.507
.739

.061***
.211
.132
.067***
.258
.171**
.073***

1.631
.554
1.354
2.347
1.221
1.110
1.227

.122***
.368
.299***
.125***
.474*
.312***
.099***

× State Hostile toward Religionb –.287
× Established/Favored Religionb .429

.211
.180*

–.794
.363

.407
.184

1.012
.931

.397*
.251***

Consider Self Religiousa
b

−1.021
–.272
1.709
–.156
.596
2.095
.374
1.062
1.649
–.152
.412

se

.399*
.216
.115***
.524
.272*
.129***
.573
.305***
.132***
.601
.386

All models control for age, gender, marital status, education, proportion unaffiliated, GDP, and communism; Models 6-A also
include religious tradition dummies; Models 6-B also include main effects for state hostile toward religion and established/
favored religion, and interactions between religious tradition dummies and proportion unaffiliated, GDP, and communism;
Level-1 N = 69,414; level-2 N = 52.
* p < .05 ; ** p < .01 ; *** p < .001
a. Models of believe in God and consider self religious are binary logistic multilevel models.
b. No state religion is omitted reference category.

religions (b = .931). At the same time, living in a nation that is hostile
toward religion also increases differences in belief in God between the
unaffiliated and both Muslims (b = 1.221) and affiliates of other religions (b = 1.012). In other words, differences in belief in God between
the affiliated and unaffiliated are smallest in nations with no state religion (the omitted reference category). These results point to the ways
that any restriction on religion—either in support of or opposed to religion—can exacerbate differences in religiosity between the affiliated
and unaffiliated. Looking at the models in Table 6 as a whole though
shows that establishment/favoring religion more consistently intensifies differences in religiosity between the affiliated and unaffiliated.
In contrast to Hypothesis 5, these results suggest that religious regulation is associated with an increase, not a decrease, in differences in
religiosity between the affiliated and unaffiliated.
The third and final alternate analysis explores the effects of national religious composition in more detail. Instead of examining how
the effects of religious affiliation on measures of religiosity vary by
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Table 7. Focal fixed effects results from multilevel models of religiosity with proportion Christian,
Muslim, and other religion.
Service Attendance
b
MODELS 7-A
Proportion Christian
Proportion Muslim
Proportion Other Religion

.107
–.195
–.118

MODELS 7-B
Christian
.932
× Proportion Christian
–.093
× Proportion Muslim
–.856
× Proportion Other Religion .050
Muslim
.904
× Proportion Christian
–.666

× Proportion Muslim
−1.388
× Proportion Other Religion –.615
Other Religion
.825
× Proportion Christian
–.020
× Proportion Muslim
–.550
× Proportion Other Religion –.235

se

Frequency of Prayer
b

.251
.233
.309
.063***
.327
.321*
.493
.072***
.467
.427**
.490
.073***
.321
.300
.443

.240
–.003
.150
.750
–.389
−1.169
.273
.900
–.704
−1.085
–.055
.684
.405
–.144
.802

se

Believe in Goda
b

se

Consider Self Religiousa
b

se

.202
.200
.275

1.305
1.483
−1.140

.363***
.341***
.615

.671
–.485
−1.370

.427
.484
.569*

.062***
.348
.344***
.490
.073***
.453

1.594
−1.643
−1.729
−1.248
2.449
−4.107

.132***
.583**
.601**
1.476
.122***
.728***

1.642
−1.366
−2.918
−1.941
2.012
−2.031

.119***
.772
.818***
1.005
.140***
.964*

.454*
.556
.090***
.357
.482
.552

−2.078
−1.685
1.637
−1.041
.510
−1.225

.628**
1.308
.120***
.540
.567
.750

−2.776
–.864
1.568
–.515
−1.699
.150

.886**
1.124
.147***
.680
.792*
.885

All models control for age, gender, marital status, education, GRI, communism, and GDP; Models 7-A also include religious
tradition dummies; Models 7-B also include interactions between religious tradition dummies and communism, GRI, and
GDP; Level-1 N = 69,414; level-2 N = 52.
* p < .05 ; ** p < .01 ; *** p < .001
a. Models of believe in God and consider self religious are binary logistic multilevel models.

the prevalence of non-affiliation in the nation (see Table 4), the models of religiosity reported in Table 7 measure the religious context
with proportion Christian, Muslim, and other religion. This provides
a different picture, potentially showing how the size of different religious groups influences the results, and how the effects of specific religious traditions are related to their prevalence in each nation. Looking across the models with interaction effects in Table 7 (Models 7-B),
it is proportion Muslim that most consistently interacts with each religious tradition. The positive effects of both Christian and Muslim on
all four measures of religiosity decline as the proportion Muslim increases. Conversely, proportion Christian only moderates the effects
of Christian and Muslim on believe in God, and the effect of Muslim
on considering one’s self religious; and proportion other religion plays
no moderating role. These findings suggest that the support for Hypothesis 6 noted above—greater differences in religiosity between the
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affiliated and unaffiliated in nations with a high proportion of unaffiliated—is disproportionately due to the lack of a Muslim presence
in those nations.

3. Discussion and conclusions
A growing body of research examines the individual attributes that
predict religious non-affiliation (e.g. Baker and Smith, 2009; Baker
and Whitehead, 2016; Schwadel, 2014) and the religious consequences
of non-affiliation (e.g. Kosmin et al., 2009; Lim et al., 2010). This research, however, is predominantly limited to the US and a few other,
primarily Western nations. Social scientific understanding of the social origins and religious repercussions of non-affiliation is therefore
similarly limited to those nations. As discussed above, the social and
cultural implications of demographic characteristics vary across nations (Ayalon et al., 2014; Cooke and Baxter, 2010; Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Schwadel, 2015), which suggests that the effects of such
characteristics on the likelihood of non-affiliation vary across nations
(Hayes, 2000). The cultural implications of religious non-affiliation
also differ from nation to nation (Ribberink et al., 2013; Wohlrab-Sahr
and Burchardt, 2012), which suggests distinct religious consequences
of being unaffiliated. This article expands on previous research by examining cross-national variation in the causes and consequences of
religious non-affiliation.
The above results show large demographic differences in the likelihood of non-affiliation. On average, men are more likely than women,
non-married are more likely than married, and young adults are more
likely than the elderly to have no religious affiliation, but the extent
and even existence of these differences varies from nation to nation.
This comports with Hayes (2000) analysis of variation in the factors
predicting non-affiliation across 10 Western, Christian nations. Going
beyond Hayes’ analysis, the results here suggest that demographic differences in the likelihood of non-affiliation are most pronounced in nations with low levels of religious regulation, which supports Hypothesis 2. As some researchers argue (e.g. Stark and Finke, 2000; Miller
and Stark, 2002), greater aversion to risk among women and older
adults may produce age and gender differences in religiosity. In nations with restrictive regulations on religion, however, risk-avoidance
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in relation to religion may instead be more evenly distributed across
the population. While a high level of religious regulation can reflect
the suppression of religion in general, it more often reflects the suppression of some religions and the establishment or semi-establishment of others (Grim and Finke, 2006).5 Consequently, high levels of
religious regulation are associated with lower levels of non-affiliation, and fewer differences by age, gender, and marital status as the
potential consequences of non-affiliation are more severe in many of
those nations. As research on conformity suggests (e.g. Blanton and
Hall, 2009), sanctions and regulations lead to less deviation from established norms.
In contrast to the first hypothesis, higher GDP is associated with
increased differences in non-affiliation between older and younger
adults. While this finding was unexpected, it may be explained by the
persistence of life-course effects and the potential impact of generations. Norris and Inglehart’s (2004) influential secularization theory
proposes that material prosperity promotes an existential security that
diminishes the need for religion. The above results add to research in
this area by suggesting that the impact of economic development on
religious non-affiliation is disproportionately found among younger
adults. Perhaps the emphasis on religion among the elderly is a universal phenomenon, regardless of the level of existential security. Alternatively, age effects can instead reflect differences across birth cohorts
because the above analysis uses cross-sectional data. Consequently,
it may be that nonaffiliation is particularly common among more recent generations in highly developed nations, which would fit with a
secularization perspective (e.g. Barro and McCleary, 2003). Overall,
these results reflect, and further knowledge of, the culturally-specific
social implications of socially constructed identities such as age, gender, and marital status (Jenkins, 2008).
Turning to the religious consequences of non-affiliation, the results
show considerable variation across nations in the religious activities
and beliefs of the unaffiliated. Differences in religiosity between the
unaffiliated and religious affiliates are largest in nations with high
proportions of unaffiliated, which supports the sixth hypothesis. This
5 For instance, in the analytic sample employed here, the nation with the highest GRI score
is a relatively secular, communist state. Those with the next two highest GRI scores are
more than 90% Muslim, but only one establishes Islam as the state religion (Pew Research Center, 2017).
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is predominantly because non-affiliates’ religiosity— particularly their
frequency of prayer, belief in God, and likelihood of considering themselves religious—is far lower in nations where there are large numbers
of unaffiliated, but the religiosity of religious affiliates is less affected
by variation in the proportion unaffiliated. In regards to secularization
debates and concerns that religious non-affiliation is a key sign of religious decline (e.g. Marwell and Demerath, 2003), this suggests that
the secularizing impact of non-affiliation is contingent on non-affiliation attaining a widespread presence in the population. Religious nonaffiliation is a social innovation (Tamney et al., 1989), which, while
highly prevalent in some nations, is all but absent in others (Hackett
et al., 2012; Hackett and Huynh, 2015). Just as religious homogeneity
is said to provide a “sacred canopy” for believers by staving off problems of plausibility (Berger, 1967), a large enough presence of nonaffiliates may provide an “unsacred canopy,” for lack of a better term,
that can strengthen the plausibility structures associated with a secular worldview.
Differences in religiosity between the religiously affiliated and unaffiliated also vary between non-communist and communist/ former
communist nations. Communism is associated with particularly low
levels of religiosity among the unaffiliated, more so than among religious affiliates. Consequently, differences in religiosity between the
affiliated and unaffiliated are especially large in communist and formerly communist nations, which supports the seventh hypothesis.
Similar to nations with large unaffiliated populations, the social acceptance of secularity in communist and formerly communist nations
(Barber, 2011; Barro and McCleary, 2003) can provide a status shield
(Hochschild, 1983) for those with more secular worldviews. In other
words, it may be easier for the unaffiliated to be less religious both
in communist/former communist nations and in nations with large
numbers of religious nonaffiliates due to reduced pressure to be religious in those contexts.
The final noteworthy finding from the primary analysis is the moderating impact of economic development on the association between
non-affiliation and belief in God. Belief in God declines as GDP increases, but much more so for the unaffiliated than for those with a
religious affiliation. Differences in belief in God between the affiliated
and unaffiliated are therefore especially large in nations with high per
capita GDP, which provides some support for the fourth hypothesis.
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These results suggest that the diminished need for religion in prosperous nations with low levels of existential insecurity (Norris and Inglehart, 2004) varies across religious affiliations. Indeed, Muslims’ belief
in God is relatively unaffected by GDP while belief in God among the
unaffiliated declines dramatically as GDP increases. Perhaps existential security is not so much a nation-level phenomenon but is instead
more strongly tied to the local context. The social world inhabited by
a Muslim in a high-GDP nation may be wrought with existential insecurities while that inhabited by a non-affiliate in the same nation
may be quite different. Future research can expand on these findings
by focusing on smaller social contexts, such as regions, cities, neighborhoods, or even the social networks that structure social relations
on a daily basis.
The ancillary models add valuable nuance to the findings. For instance, the interactions between religious regulation and communism
suggest that the relatively robust differences in religiosity between
the affiliated and unaffiliated in communist/post-communist nations
is not due to higher levels of religious regulation in those nations.6 In
other words, communism appears to exacerbate differences in religiosity—particularly belief in God and considering one’s self religious—
between the affiliated and unaffiliated for reasons unrelated to how
the government treats religion. As I discuss below, a focus on the social
as opposed to legal acceptance of religion and secularity may provide
6 Additional models combined the approaches in Table 5 and 6 to examine how the effects of
communism vary by state hostility toward religion. Recall that the primary interactions
with communism and religious affiliations were in the models of belief in God and considering one’s self religious (Table 4). I ran identical models but replaced the communism
measure with two dummy variables: Communist nation that is not hostile toward religion and communist nation that is hostile toward religion. Results from the model of belief in God show significant, positive interactions between Christianity and both communist nations hostile toward religion (b = 1.387) and communist nations that are not hostile
toward religion (b = .833), between Muslim and communist nations that are hostile toward religion (b = 1.223), and between other religion and both communist nations hostile toward religion (b = 2.045) and communist nations that are not hostile toward religion (b = 1.034). Results from the model of considering one’s self religious show positive
interactions between Christianity and both communist nations hostile toward religion (b
= .934) and communist nations that are not hostile toward religion (b = 1.089), and between other religion and both communist nations hostile toward religion (b = 1.324) and
communist nations that are not hostile toward religion (b = 1.476). Similar to the results
in Table 5, these results also suggest that that the relatively robust differences in religiosity between the affiliated and unaffiliated in communist/post-communist nations is not
due to state-level hostility toward religion in such nations.
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greater insight into the impact of living in communist/post-communist nations. Another interesting finding from the ancillary models is
the relative similarity in belief in God between the affiliated and unaffiliated in nations with neither an established/favored religion nor
state hostility toward religion. This contributes to the supply-side perspective (e.g. Stark and Finke, 2000) by pointing to the potentially
higher levels of religiosity among the unaffiliated when there is a free
religious marketplace. Lastly, the ancillary models indicate that the
relatively large differences in religiosity between the affiliated and
unaffiliated in nations with high proportions of unaffiliated are disproportionately due to the small number of Muslims in such nations.
This suggests that individual-level variation in religiosity may be suppressed in Muslim-majority nations in particular.
There are, of course, other important limitations to the analyses reported here. The WVS includes four broadly-applicable measures of religiosity in the form of service attendance, frequency of prayer, belief
in God, and considering one’s self religious. Still, given the comparative nature of the research, other indicators may be more relevant for
certain religious groups, such as the importance of ancestors in some
Asian religions. The cross-sectional nature of the data is another restriction, which limits the causal conclusions that can be drawn from
the analysis. It is entirely possible, for example, for someone to withdraw from religious activities, then decline in their belief, and then
eventually disaffiliate from religion. Future research can expand on
this article by employing cross-national, longitudinal data, though
such data are rare. Additional nation-level measures may also further understanding of the demographic origins and religious consequences of apostasy. For instance, I focused on a single measure of
government regulation of religion (GRI) while the social acceptance
of religion is related to but not equivalent to such government regulation (Grim and Finke, 2006).
Religious non-affiliation is a worldwide phenomenon that is transforming understanding of human societies. Those with no religion
now constitute the world’s third largest religious group, and the second largest group in almost half of all nations (Hackett and Huynh,
2015). This article makes clear that who is unaffiliated and the religious consequences of such non-affiliation vary across nations. Taylor’s (2007) work on secularity is particularly relevant here as he
describes the cultural transformation that led to the contemporary
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context where secularity is a viable option. But this “secular age” is
not uniformly distributed around the world. It is more socially acceptable to be less religious or even irreligious in some nations than in
others. Moreover, the negative effect of secular contexts on individuals’ religious beliefs and behaviors is most robust for the unaffiliated.
Not all apostates live in social contexts that allow for the easy secular
choices Taylor describes. Instead, non-affiliates who live in nations
with many other non-affiliates, communist/formerly communist nations, and high per capita GDP nations appear more amenable to (or
able to) choose secularity.
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